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STEPHEN  Bo  WEEKS 

CLASS  OF  1886;  PUD.  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 

LIBRARY 

OF  THE 


HE  WEEKS  OTJJECTION 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
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http://archive.org/details/criticismsonsurrOOslsn 


\  .V 

■ 
€2  3»  IVICX1S  2WE  *» 

ON   THE 

Surrender  of  Johnston's  Army, 

WITH  THE  "MEMORANDUM"  THEREON  AS  PRE- 
SENTED BY  THE  EXECUTIVE. 

-— 

The  public  papers  which  defend  General  Sherman  against 
the  attacks  made  on  him  for  his  transaction  with  Johnston, 
including  the  capture  and  surrender  of  the  rebel  army,  gener- 
ally assume  it  as  a  foregone  conclusion  that  he  made  &  mistake, 
yet  no  one  has  shown  us  wherein  the  mistake  consisted,  and  I 
venture  to  say  that  no  one  can  show  anything  in  the  matter, 
either  in  principle  or  in  detail,  inception  or  result,  to  which  the 
most  punctilious  can  object.  I  refer,  as  a  matter  of  course,  to 
what  he  in  fact  did,  not  to  what  is  assumed  for  him,  or  falsely 
imputed  to  him.     The  actual  facts,  plainly  told,  are  these : — 

On  the  18th  of  April  Sherman  had  Johnston  so  hemmed  in 
that  he  must  either  fight  01  surrender.  On  that  day,  in  this 
condition  of  things,  the  two  Generals  met  and  discussed  not 
only  the  surrender  of  the  army  under  Johnston,  but  the  other 
Rebel  forces  in  the  South  and  West,  in  the  expressed  hope  that 
they  might  save  further  effusion  of  blood.  As  the  proposed  ac- 
tion, except  as  far  as  concerned  forces  under  the  command  of 
each  was  beyond  their  power,  they  agreed  t©  a  suspension  of 
hostilities,  their  armies  remaining  in  statu  quo,  until  each  could 
consult  with  and  obtain  the  instructions  of  those  in  power, 
Sherman,  of  course,  that  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  his  Cabinet.  He  reported  at  once,  and  received  instruc- 
tions to  confine  himself  to  the  mere  military  surrender  of  the 
rebel  troops  in  his  power.  He  accordingly  received  the  sur- 
render of  Johnston  with  his  27,000  men  with  their  arms  and 
munitions  of  war,  precisely  what  he  would  have  done  had  the 
Cabinet  directed  him  not  to  negotiate,  but  without  any  attempt 
to  excite  a  public  clamor.  This  is  all  Sherman  did  and  all  he 
proposed  to  do  until  he  should  receive  instructions  from  the 
Department.  He  held  Johnston  and  his  army  firmly,  he  lost, 
no  advantage  which  he  could  have  gained  bad  he  attacked 
Johnston  immediately  without  negotiating, but  saved  no  doubt 
the  effusion  of  blood. 

Now  I  am  at  a  loss  to  find  the  mistake.  Was  it  in  the  pro- 
positions which  were  sent  to  the  President  and  Cabinet?  They 
are  greatly  misrepresented  in  the  Secretary  s  Bulletin.     But 

ft 

&   ■ 


it  is  no  matter  what  they  were,  they  came  without  authority. 
Sherman  assumed  none,  but  simply  sent  the  proposition  to  be 
passed  upon  by  the  Cabinet.  "Sigma,"  a  very  able  writer  in 
the  Commercial,  and  one  who  represents  the  case  fairly,  is  of 
opinion  that  the  propositions  were  themselves  the  best  practic- 
al. It  may  be  so  and  probably  is,  but  a  year's  experience  will 
show  us. 

But  in  this  matter  General  Sherman  could  hardly  be  charg- 
ed with  thinking  for  himself.  The  propositions  submitted 
were  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  last  speech,  while 
General  Sherman  no  doubt  had  seen  as  it  was  in  all  the  public 
prints — and  there  is  no  proof  and  indeed  no  pretence  that  he 
had  seen  Mr.  Lincoln's  instructions  to  General  Grant,  with 
which  the  propositions  are  so  elaborately  contrasted  in  the 
Secretary's  Bulletin.  The  propositions  may  be  the  best,  of  the 
worst  possible,  but  in  either  case  I  have  yet  to  learn  that  there 
was  a  mistake  in  making  them  known  to  the  President. 

T.  EWING. 


From  the  New  York  Leader. 
SHERMAN'S  ARMISTICE. 


How  much  truth  there  may  be,  or  whether  there  be  an}7  truth 
at  all,  in  the  current  statements  that  Secretary  Stanton  has  or- 
ganized a  crusade  against  Sherman  we  do  not  know.  The 
World  says  that  such. a  crusade  is  being  attempted;  the  Herald 
says  that  it  is  not;  the  l^imes  appears  to  join  in  the  attack,  and 
the  Tribune,  which  might  have  been  expected  to  treat  Sherman- 
cavalierly,  steps  promptly  forward  as  his  defender.  In  this 
muddle,  only  one  thing  seems  to  be  certain,  and  that  is  the 
exceeding  bad  taste  and  bad  temper  or  Secretary  Stanton'* 
telegrams  upon  the  Sherman  armistice. 

if  those  telegrams  have  provoked  any  illifeel'ing  towards  Gen- 
eral Sherman  in  the  popular  mind  w?  have  yet  to  see  evidences- 
t)f  such  a  feeling.  So  far  as  we  can  learn,  the  ill-feeling  is  all 
against  Stanton  for  the  ungenerous  manner  in  which  he  has- 
presented  the  case.  It  would  havo  been  amply  sufficient  had 
lie  simply  telegraphed  to  Major-General  Dix,  for  publication, 
that  Sherman  had  exceeded  his  orders- and  made  an  unsatis- 
factory agreement  with  Johnston;  and  that  the  agreement  was- 
disapproved  by  Grant,  who  had  gone  to  North  Carolina  to 
resume  hostilities.  This  statement  embraces  all  the  facts;  but 
Secretary  Stanton  could  not  be  content  with  it.  Ho  must 
gum  the  case  up  in  advance,  and  get  judgment  before  Sher- 
man could  bo  heard.  In  trying  to  do  so  he  has  demonstra- 
ted his  own  weakness  and  Sherman's  strength. 

TVe  do  not  by  any  means  impugn  Secretary  Stanton's  mo- 
tives. He  may  be  Sherman's  personal  friend,  for  all  we  know. 
It  is  his  style  which  is    bad,    although  his  motives  may  be  as 

■   3 


3 

pure  as  Sherman's  patriotism.  Hot-headed  and  impulsive,  he 
rushed  quickly  to  the  conclusion  that  Sherman  had  made  a 
blunder,  and  at  once  set  to  work  to  prove  this  conclusion  cor- 
rect. He  would  have  been  wiser  had  he  considered  his  proof's 
first  and  reached  his  conclusion  logically.  Being  a  lawyer,  he 
must  form  his  theories  and  twist  his  evidence  even  in  such  an 
important  State  affair  as  the  condemnation  of  one  of  our  best 
and  most  popular  generals.  But  the  public  must  remember 
that  Sherman  is  quite  as  shrewd  and  able  a  man  as  Stanton, 
and  that  his  side  of  the  case  has  yet  to  be  heard.  We  object 
to  these  snap-judgments  about  anybody  or  anything.  Let 
Sherman  give  the  reasons  for  his  course  before  people  pro- 
nounce him  a  fool.  And  let  those  ultra  Bepublican  journals 
be  very  careful  of  their  facts  before  they  again  insinuate  that 
he  is  a  knave. 

Having  attentively  perused  all  the  documents  in  regard  to 
the  armistice  which  have  been  officially  published,  we  can  dis- 
cover no  good  grounds  for  Secretary  Stanton's  aggrieved  tone, 
nor  for  the  extraordinary  instructions  he  has  issued  to  sub- 
ordinate officers  not  to  obey  Sherman's  orders.  When  Sher- 
man hears  of  those  instructions  he  will  undoubtedly  hand  his 
resignation  to  President  Johnston,  and  either  he  or  Stanton 
must  retire.  No  matter  how  wrong  General  Sherman  may 
have  been,  Secretary  Stanton  had  no  right  to  forward  such  in- 
structions to  his  subordinates,  except  through  Sherman  him- 
self. Two  wrongs  never  make  a  right.  If  General  Sherman 
has  exceeded  his.  authority,  Secretary  Stanton  has  violated 
military  etiquette.  He  could  have  removed  Sherman,  but  he 
could  not  properly  instruct  his  subordinates  to  disobey  him. — 
In  his  eagerness  to  put  Sherman  in  the  wrong,  Mr.  Stanton 
has  placed  himself  in  a  peculiarly  perplexing  position.  The 
spectacle  of  a  Secretary  of  War  bursting,  lrke  a  mad  bull, 
through  the  well-known  rules  of  the  service,  is  not  particular- 
ly edifying  to  soldiers  or  civilians. 

General  Sherman  and  the  Rebel  General  Johnston  had  sev- 
eral meetings  and  agreed  upon  terms  which  completely  demol- 
ished the  Rebellion.  It  is  a  mistaken  idea  that  Johnston  only 
surrendered  his  own  army  to  Sherman,  as  Lee  surrendered 
his  to  Grant.  Johnston  surrendered  the  entire  Rebellion. — ■ 
There  was  no  reservation,  Jeff  Davis  himself  was  not  except- 
ed. It  may  have  appeared  right  to  General  Sherman  to  exceed 
his  authority  a  little  in  order  to  accomplish  this  immense  vie 
tory.  That  he  may  have  overstepped  his  orders  is  granted  ' 
but  it  was  in  permitting  an  armistice,  not  in  arranging  am 
agreement. to  be  sent  to  Washington  for  approval.  This  poini 
— the  only  one  at  which  Sherman  is  vulnerable — Mr.  Stanton 
has  overlooked  altogether.  He  had  the  right  to  make  a  basis 
for  peace;  but  perhaps  he  had  no  right  to  suspend  hostilities. — 
The  armistice,  not  the  agreement,  was  an  act  which  may  have 


called  for  censure.  All  Stanton's  rigmarole  about  the  presence 
of  Mr.  Lincoln  at  the  capitol  on  the  night  of  March  3d,  and  the 
note  which  he  penned  with  his  own  hand,  does  not  touch  the- 
real  issue.  Sherman's  error  was  in  declaring  a  truce;  but  for 
that  he  may  have  had  satisfactory  reasons. 

The  note  of  President  Lincoln  refers  purely  to  ''political 
questions."  The  surrender  of  all  the  Eebels  in  arms  Was  a 
military  question,  and  Sherman  treated  it  like  a  military  man. 
When  the  terms  presented  by  the  Rebels  were  found  to  em- 
brace political  questions,  he  neither  accepted  nor  rejected  them 
— he  at  once  referred  them  to  Washington.  Why  this  should 
have  aroused  Secretary  Stanton's  wrath  we  are  unable  to  per- 
ceive. Nor  is  the  statement  of  Stanton's  telegram — a  state- 
ment since  disproved — that  Sherman's  recall  of  Stoneman's 
cavalry  opened  the  road  to  Mexico  to  Jeff.  Davis  and  his  treas- 
ures any  more  pertinent.  Jeff  Davis  was  with  Johnston.  He 
was  included  in  the  surrender.  This  fact  vitiates  Stanton's 
absurd  rhetoric  and  suggests  that,  instead  of  quoting  Lincoln's 
letter  and  a  bit  of  Richmond  gossip,  the  Secretary  of  War 
would  have  occupied  his  time  better  had  he  shown  that  Sher- 
man was  ever  ordered  not  to  agree  to  an  armistice,  not  to  sus- 
pend hostilities,  not  to  cease  fighting  when  the  only  Rebel 
General  in  the  field  offered  to  give  up  the  whole  Confederacy, 
dismiss  all  the  Rebel  armies  and  restore  all  the  seceded  States 
to  the  Union.  Secretary  Stanton  does  not  refer  to  any  such 
orders  in  his  telegram,  and  he  has  not  yet  produced  them. 

Now,  having  cleared  away  all  the  preliminaries  of*  this  af- 
fair, and  demonstrated  that  Sherman  was  in  the  right  in  hold- 
ing conferences  with  Johnston,  and  that  no  evidence  has  yet 
been  presented  proving  him  in  the  wrong  in  granting  an  ar- 
mistice, let  us  examine  the  objections  offered  to  his  memoran- 
dum of  agreement,  and  see  how  far  they  are  valid. 

The  first  objection  is  that  uit  was  an  exercise  of  authority 
not  vested  in  General  Sherman  and  on  its  face  shows  that  both 
he  and  Johnston  knew  that  he  had  no  authority  to  enter  into 
any  such  arrangement."  Yery  good  ;  but  unfortunately  not 
original.  General  Sherman  had  stated  these  facts  to  Johnston 
and  they  appear  in  the  memorandum.  Sherman  says,  "''Not 
being  fully  empowered  by  my  principal  to  fulfill  these  terms,  I 
individually  and  officially  pledge  myself  to  promptly  obtain 
the  necessary  authority."  Why,  that  was  precisely  the  reason 
why  he  sent  the  memorandum  to  Washington.  He  knew  he 
had  not  the  authorit}*,  and  he  asked  the  President  to  rati??  His 
agreement.  The  first  objection  is  therefore  silly.  The  second 
objection  is  that  ''it  was  a  practical  acknowledgment  of  the 
Rebel  Government."  Well,  Sherman  acknowledged  the  Rebel 
Government  only  far  enough  to  accept  the  surrender  of  the 
whole  concern.  It  seems  to  us  that  every  body  would  have 
been  satisfied  with  such  an  acknowledgment.     The  Confedera- 


5 

■ey  would  not  have  gained  much  by  it.     On  the  whole,  we  fear 
that  this  objection  is  as  silly  as  the  first. 

Thirdly,  "it  undertook  to  establish  the  Eebel  State 'Gov- 
ernment'' and  '-placed  arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the  hands 
of  the  Eebels  at  their  respective  capitals."  Will  Secretary 
Stanton  please  to  recollect  that  there  would  have,  been  no 
Eebels  had  Sherman's  terms  been  approved?  The  members  of 
the  seceded  State  governments  were  "to  take  the  oath  pre- 
scribed by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,"  thus  placing 
themselves  in  the  Union  and  under  our  laws.  The  "arms  and 
munitions  of  war"  were  to  be  "subject  to  future  action  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,"  so  that  Congress  could  have 
removed  them  from  the  State  capitals  immediately.  This  ob- 
jection is  as  invalid  as  the  others.  The  fourth  objection  is  that 
the  Eebels  "would  be  enabled  to  re-establish  slavery."  But 
the  South  can  re-establish  it  in  any  event  if  the  Constitutional 
Amendment  be  not  adopted  by  the  States,  and  if  the  Supreme 
Court  does  not  decide  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  consti- 
tutional. But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  Amendment  be  adopt- 
ed, or  the  Proclamation  pronounced  Constitutional,  then  slave- 
ry cannot  be  established,  even  if  there  were  anything  in  the 
terms  of  agreement — which  say  nothing  about  slavery — to  re- 
establish  it.     Objection  number  four  consequently  fails. 

Fifth,  "if  might  furnish  a  ground  of  responsibility  to  pay  the 
Eebel  debt."  Here  is  an  objection  based  on  a  "might,"  to 
which  we  only  reply  that  "it  might  not."  But  "it  certainly 
subjects  loyal  citizens  of  the  rebel  States  to  the  debt  contracted 
by  the  Eebels  in  the  name  of  the  State."  It  seems  to  us  that 
the  Eebel  debt  would  be  repudiated  by  the  terms  of  re-union, 
so  that  no  one  would  have  anything  to  pay.  But  if  the  debt 
is  to  hold  good  on  the  State,  we  should  like  to  know  how  loyal 
citizens  can  escape  their  share  of  it,  since  everybody  would 
claim  to  be  loyal  so  soon  as  a  special  tax  were  decreed.  It  is  a 
new  idea  that  our  Secretary  of  War  should  recognize  and  urge 
the  payment  of  the  Eebel  war  debt.  He  must  have  been  hard 
pushed  for  objections  when  he  selected  number  five.  Objection 
sixth  is  that  "it  puts  in  dispute  the  existence  of  loyal  State 
governments,  and  the  new  State  of  Western  Yirginia,  which 
had  been  recognized  by  every  department  of  the  United  States 
government."  What  loyal  State  governments?  That  of  Louis- 
iana, for  instance,  which  Wade  and  Winter  Davis  pronounce 
without  actual  existence?  And  how  does  it  put  them  in  dis- 
pute? Simply  by  "submitting  them  to  the  Supreme  Court." — 
Cannot  they  stand  this  test?  Has  Stanton  no  confidence  in 
Chase?  As  for  Western  Yirginia,  what  has  she  to  fear  when 
she  "has  been  recognized  by  every  department  of  the  United 
States  Government?"  Objection  the  sixth  is  very,  very  feeble. 
Seventh,  "it  practically  abolishes  the  Confiscation  law  and  re- 
lieve Eebels   of  every  degree  from  all  pains  and  penalties." — 


This  is  an  untrue  assertion.     The  Confiscation  laws  were  passed 
by  Congress,    and    the    "degree"  of   Eebels  to  be  pardoned  is 
fixed  by  Congress.     The   agreement  promises  an  amnesty  "bo 
far  as  the  Executive  power  ot  the  United  States  can  command." 
As  the  Executive  cannot   disobey  or  reverse  the  laws  of  Con- 
gress,  the  confiscation   laws  would  remain  in  full  force,  and 
v,the  pains  and  penalties"  could  be  applied  to  rebels  above  a 
certain  rank,  as  provided  by  Congress  in  the  authority  given 
to  the   President  to  freely  pardon  all  Eebels  under  a  certain 
rank.     The  seventh  objection  is  consequently  false  and  void. 
The  eighth  objection  is  that  President  Lincoln  "deliberately, 
repeatedly  and  solemnly  rejected"  the  same  terms — which,  if 
true,  does  President  Lincoln  no  credit,  and,  if  false,  is  an  insult 
to  his  memory — "and  gives  the  Eebels  better  terms  than  they 
had  ever  asked  in  their  most  prosperous  condition" — which  wo 
know  to   be  untrue,  for  the  Eebels  asked  the  recognition   of 
their  Confederacy.     Objection    eight  falls   for  these   reasons. 
The  ninth  and  last  objection  is  that  it  "leaves   the  Eebels   in 
condition  to  renew  their  effort  to  overthrow  the  United  States 
Government  whenever  their  strength  is  recruited  and  any  op- 
portunity offers."     Not  more  than  any  other  peace  would. — 
Not   so  much  as  Grant's  agreement  with  Lee  does.     On  the 
contrary,  the  terms  of  Sherman  would  have  taken  the  rebell- 
ious heart  out  of  the  Eebels,  and  given  us  the  quickest,  surest, 
and  most  lasting  peace. 

The  Rebel  Johnston  has  since  surrendered  on  Grant's  terms 
to  Lee,'  and  Stanton  will  undoubtedly  claim  this  as  a  great,  vic- 
tory, and  exult  accordingly.  Put  it  is  not  so  great  a  victory  as- 
Sherman  would  have  gained.  It  merely  secures  to  us  John- 
ston's command,  while  Sherman  would  have  given  us  the 
whole  Confederacy.  It  settles  nothing  for  the  future,  while 
Sherman's  plan  provided  for  reconstruction.  Secretary  Stan- 
ton ma}'  tcdegraph  as  he  pleases,  and  flourish  in  dispatches  as 
each  little  squad  of  Eebels  follow  Johnsion's  example:  but  this 
prolonged  sorrender  is  not  so  decisive  as  the  immediate,  com- 
plete and  comprehensive  surrender  which  General  Sherman 
had  arranged,  It  is  better  to  bo  right  than  to  have  all  the 
bluster  on  our  side.  Sherman,  grasping  all  the  issues,  con- 
cluded to  do  at  once  that  which  is  now  to  be  done  in  detail. — 
No  sound  objections  were  offered  to  his  plan;  the  objections 
which  were  offered  seem  extremely  foolish,  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  were  prefaced,  and  the  temper  in  which  the}'  were 
stated,  imply  less  of  hostility  to  the  Eebellion  than  of anger  to  a 
General  who  has  presumed  to  do  something  unexpected.  But 
Sherman  has  always  done  unexpected  things.  3Ie  is  a  genius 
and  hi^  mind  grapples  and  solves  the  most  perplexing  pro!» 
lems.  We  can  imagine  the  mingled  indignation  and  astonish- 
ment with  which  he  must  have  received  the  arrogant  telegrams 
of  Air.  Stanton,  and  we  shared  his  indignation  and  his  aston- 


ishment  alike.  Whether  he  be  popular  or  unpopular,  honored 
or  disgraced,  We  insist  that  General  Sherman's  plan  of  paci- 
fication was  a  good  one,  that  it  practically  assured  to  us  all 
for  which  we  have  been  fighting,  and  that  all  intellight  peo- 
ple will  so  regard  it  when  this  great  and  patriotic  General  is 
heard  in  his  own  defence. 

From  the  Cincinnati  Commercial. 
A  WOED  FOE  SHEEMAN.— No.  1. 

This  gallani  soldier  has  bewi  denounced  in  no  measured 
terms;  his  great  services  are  ignored,  and  for  one  error  all  the 
past  is  forgotten.  He  is  again  called  a  madman  in  one  breath, 
and  a  political  s'chemer  in  the  next.  A  cruel  ingenuity  per- 
verts his  attempt  to  restore  peace  to  the  low  ambition  of  a  po- 
litical demagogue,  seeking  personal  advantage  by  the  sacrifice 
of  the  great  cause  in  which  he  has  so  often  risked  his  life  and 
gained  his  laurels.  The  cause  of  justice  requires  that  we  give 
a  fair  consideration  for  this  one  act  for  which  he  is  so  unmerci- 
fully denounced.  Let  us  not  too  readily  follow  the  lead  Of 
those  who  are  so  ready  to  destroy  such  a  man,  and  to  impute  to 
him  motives  for  that  act  wholly  at  variance  with  his  character 
and  antecedents. 

On  the  18th  inst.  General  Sherman  and  General  Johnston 
signed  a  "memorandum  or  basis  of  agreement."  It  consists  of 
seven  articles,  all  of  which  except  the  first,  are  left,  certainly, 
so  far  as  Sherman  is  concerned,  for  the  consideration  of  his 
superiors,  to  be  ratified,  modified  or  totally  rejected  as  may  seem 
best.  The  only  point  which  Sherman  undertakes  to  settle  him- 
self, is  the  armistice,  the  temporary  suspension  of  hostilities  to 
continue  only  until  the  decision  is  made  upon  the  other  articles 
by  the  proper  authorities,  and  then  to  cease  upon  forty-eight 
hours  notice,  if  the  terms  are  rejected.  This  I  repeat,  is  the 
only  point  which  Sherman  agrees  to  in  the  sense  of  a  binding 
stipulation,  or  as  within  his  own  just  authority. 

Certainly  no  one  can  doubt  the  power  of  a  commanding  offi- 
cer, where  two  armies  confront  each  other,  upon  a  sudden  emer- 
gency, to  agree  to  an  armistice  between  their  forces.  The 
most  usual  exercise  of  this  power  is  to  bury  the  dead.  The 
common  right  of  humanity  requires  such  an  authority.  So,  too, 
touching  the  living  as  well  as  the  dead,  if  there  is  a  proposi- 
tion which  will  stop  the  further  effusion  of  blood,  and  which 
involves  points  beyond  the  authority  of  the  General  in  com- 
mand, and  which  he  deems  to  be  worthy  of  consideration,  it  is 
not  only  within  his  power,  but  it  is  his  duty  to  entertain  them, 
and  to  6top  further  slaughter  until  the  matter  can  be  submitted 
to  those  functions  it  is  to  decide. 

Now  let  us  treat  Sherman  fairly,  for  we  are  now  considering 
his  motives.     The  articles  contained  in  the  memorandum  may 


8 

not  recommend  themselves  to  us,  but  what  warrant  have  we 
to  say  that  they  did  not  recommend  themselves  to  Sherman?— 
I  am  one  of  those  w'ho  believe  that  there  is  not  a  man  in  the 
Republic,  in  the  field  or  in  civil  life,  more  frank,  more  earnest, 
more  devoted  to  the  cause,  and  more  unselfish.  Furthermore, 
now  that  Abraham  Lincoln  is  gone,  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  man 
whose  views  are  more  comprehensive  of  the  whole  character  ot 
the  great  struggle  through  which  we  are  passing. 

Certainly,  he  was  among  the  first—if  not  the  very  first — to 
comprehend  it  m  the  beginning.  He  was  flippantly  written 
down  as  insane  for  the  prophetic  declaration  then  made.  He 
was  altogether  right  then;  he  may  be  altogether  wrong  now. — 
Perhaps  not.  The  future  may  undeceive  him;  probably  it  may 
undeceive  us.  . 

Next,  let  us  see  for  ourselves  what  this  "memorandum" 
really  signifies;  and,  in  this  connection,  let  us  carry  along  the 
strictures  upon  it  that  are  said  to  come  from  the  Cabinet. 

The  first  article  provides  that  the  contending  armies  com- 
manded by  Sherman  and  Johnston  respectively,  are  to  remain 
in  statu  quo,  until  the  decision  is  made.  This,  as  I  have  said, 
is  the  only  article  which  Sherman  claims  to  settle  on  his  own 
authority. 

It  holds  Johnston  and  his  army  fastened  to  the  spot.  It 
gives  them  no  opportunity  to  retreat.  It  is  a  pledge  that 
they  will  not  escape.  If  a  single  brigade  attempts  a  flight,  the 
armistice  is  broken,  and  Sherman,  who  is  there  to  watch,  is 
also  there  to  pursue. 

The  second  article  provides  for  the  disbanding  not  only  of 
Johnston's  army  but  of  all  the  Confederate  armies  then  "in  ex- 
istence." Every  one  of  these  armies  is  to  be  broken  up,  and  its 
soldiers  are  to  be  conducted  in  detached  bodies  to  the  capitals 
of  their  respective  States,  and  there  deposit  their  arms  in  the 
State  arsenals. 

Observe,  there  is  no  article  which  looks  to  the  disbanding  of 
any  of  our  armies — not  one  loyal  soldier  is  to  be  disarmed. — 
Wherever  we  have  an  army,  a  military  post,  or  a  camp;  wher- 
ever we  occupy  a  fortress  or  a  city,  our  rightful  position  there 
is  not  changed  or  disturbed,  and  our  eoldiers  are  to  remain  un- 
til we  see  fit  to  recall  them*. 

Observe  now,  that  the  arms  are  to  be  deposited  in  the  arse- 
nals of  each  State,  at  the  "State  capitals."  Pray,  into  whose 
custody  do  they  come?  Nearly  all  their  State  capitals  are  in 
our  possession;  every  person  and  everything  they  contain  is  in 
our  power.  If  there  is  any  State  capital  not  yet  in  our  pos- 
session, we  have  the  right  to  send  our  soldiers  there  the  mo- 
ment these  articles  come  into  force;  for  at  the  same  moment  the 
Federal  authority  is  acknowledged  all  over  the  South,  and  the 
Government,  through  the  War  Department,    may  order  our 


■soldiers  to  any  place  in  the  South,  by  the  same  authority  it  has 
to  order  them  to  any  place  in  the  North. 

Tho  objection  taken  to  this  article  at  Washington  is,  that  it 
places  "the  arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels, 
at  their  respective  capitals,  which  might  be  used  as  soon  as 
the  armies  of  the  United  States  were  disbanded,  and  used 
to  conquer  and  subdue  the  loyal  States." 

Bui,  if  these  consequences  are  to  follow,  whose  fault  will  it 
be?  Certainly  not  Sherman's.  If  these  arms  "might  be  used 
as  soon  as  our  armies  are  disbanded,''  or  as  soon  as  we  with- 
draw the  force  necessary  to  their  safe  keeping,  we  will  know 
where  to  fix  the  responsibility.  Sherman  certainly  has  not 
disbanded  our  armies  ;  he  has  not  withdrawn  our  custody  over 
those  arms,  but  exactly  the  contrary,  he  stipulates  that  they 
shall  come  right  under  our  own  guns,  and  be  subject  to  our 
military  vigilance.  If  these  same  arms  might  be  used  after 
the  men  who  carried  them  are  dispersed,  if  they  are  such  dan- 
gerous articles  when  in  our  power,  it  seems  to  me  they  are  a 
little  more  dangerous  when  they  are  in  the  hands  of  a  veteran 
army. 

There  is  a  provision  with  respect  to  this  deposit  of  arms  that 
does  not  seem  to  be  understood.  It  is  that,  until  Congress 
otherwise  provides,  they  are  to  remain  at  their  places  of  de- 
posit "to  be  used  solely  to  maintain  peace  aad  order  within  the 
borders  of  the  States  respectively.''  This  is  one  of  the  ordina- 
ry safeguards  provided  in  every  State  for  its  own  tranquility. 
I  do  not  know  of  one  which  has  not  this  protection  against 
domestic  insurrection.  It  is  of  such  vital  importance  that  it  is 
secured  to  every  State  by  express  constitutional  provision. — 
Certainly  all  over  these  Southern  States  there  is  danger  of  "do- 
mestic violence"  contemplated  by  the  Constitution.  There  is 
no  safety  there  if  the  white  population  is  disarmed.  Allow 
them  means  of  defense  against  a  terrible  danger,  but  see  to  it 
that  they  use  these  arms,  as  the  memorandum  has  it,  only  to 
maintain  order. 

I  think  we  have  gone  far  enough  with  this  memorandum  to 
reach,  at  least,  one  safe  conclusion,  and  that  is,  that  it  effectu- 
ally destroys  the  military  power  of  the  confederacy.  It  puts 
an  end  to  the  war  without  shedding  another  drop  of  blood. — 
We  can  afford  to  pay  a  high  price  for  such  a  consummation. 
If  there  is  a  calamity  to  ensue,  equal  or  greater  than  the  one 
which  it  removes;  if  the  price  is  out  of  all  proportion  with  the 
benefit;  if  the  bad  outweighs  the  good;  if  the  mischiefs  of 
peace  that  is  to  come  are  greater  than  the  war  now  waged;  if 
this  certain  deliverance  is  no  more  certain  than  a  future  and 
better  deliverance,  why  then,  let  the  war  go  on.  It  is  a 
grave  question  to  consider,  and  an  awful  responsibility  must 
attend  its  decision.  SICiM*. 


10 
A  WOED  FOE  SHEEMAN— NO.  2. 

In  a  former  communication  I  considered  the  first  and  second 
articles  of  the  ';  Memorandum.  "  The  next  four  articles  provide 
for  the  state  of  things  which  is  to  ensue  when  the  rebels  have 
laid  down  their  arms  and  have  submitted  themselves  to  Feder- 
al authority. 

The  first  inquiry  that  arises  here  is  this  :  "Why  did  Sherman 
entertain  or  receive  any  proposition,  beyond  that  of  the  sur- 
render of  Johnston's  army  ?  Why  did  he  not  follow  exactly 
the  precedent  between  Grant  and  Lee? 

A  moment's  reflection  will  show  us  that  the  matter  in  treaty 
between  Sherman  and  Johnston  was  altogether  different  from 
that  between  Grant  and  Lee.  Lee  only  proposed  to  surrender 
the  army  then  in  the  field  under  his  immediate  command. — 
Johnston  proposed  to  disband  all  the  armies  in  the  Confedera- 
cy. Lee  did  not  propose  to  put  au  end  to  the  war.  Johnston 
did.  Lee  asked  and  obtained  terms  for  every  soldier  and  offi- 
cer embraced  in  his  surrender,  for  he  compromised  no  others. 
Johnston  asked  for  terms  for  every  officer  and  soldier,  and  for 
every  citizen  or  rebel,  embraced  in  his  surrender,  for  he  com- 
promised every  one  of  them.  If  it  was  proper  for  Lee  to  ask 
for  terms  for  his  soldiers,  it  was  quite  as  proper  for  Johnston 
to  ask  for  terms  for  all  the  rebels,  armed  and  unarmed,  soldiers 
and  civilians,    for  he  surrenders  them  all. 

This  explains  Sherman's  course.  It  appears  that  a  proposi- 
tion lor  surrender  came  from  Johnston,  and  that  Sherman,  at 
first  understanding  it  only  to  cover  Johnston's  army,  promptly 
replied  that  he  would  give  the  same  terms  as  Grant  had  given 
Lee.  But  when  Sherman  came  to  understand  that  the  propo- 
sition was  of  a  very  different  and  vastly  more  important  char- 
acter, the  precedent  did  not  appl}7.  Other  interests  were  in- 
volved besides  those  of  the  army  of  Johnston,  and  it  was  proper 
to  consider  them. 

Now,  to  show  that  Sherman  had  jurisdiction  (if  I  may  ex- 
press myself  as  a  lawyer,)  to  entertain  terms  beyond  the  mere 
surrender  of  Johnston's  army,  put  the  case  that  the  terms  of- 
fered by  Johnston  wero  that  the  rebel  armies  should  be  disban- 
ded, and  that  the  mass  of  the  people,  excluding  the  leaders, 
should  not  be  punished,  would  Sherman  have  been  justified  in 
saying,  "  I  can  not  entertain  such  terms,  for  they  provide  for  a 
partial  amnesty,  and  for  others  besides  the  soldiers  of  your 
army?"  Sherman,  therefore,  did  not  go  beyond  his  proper 
limits  in  receiving  and  considering  terms  more  comprehensive 
th  vn  those  fixed  in  the  precedent  of  Grant  and  Lee. 

Now,  next,  what  are  these  terms  ?  No  one  was  bound  by 
them.  They  are  now  abrogated.  More  strictty  speaking,  they 
never  came  in  force.  We  don't  know  haw  they  were  received 
by  Johnston's  "principles,"  but  we  do  know  how   they  were 


11 

received  bjr  Sherman's  "principals."  They  were  rejected  in 
toto;  not  modified  in  a  single  particular,  nor,  as  far,  as  we 
hear,  was  any  counter-proposition  sent  back,  not  even  on  the 
basis  fixed  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  made  known  to  the  rebel  com- 
missioners before  Richmond,  as  the  terms  to  which  he  would 
agree.  Not  a  word  as  to  an  amnesty,  general  or  special.  Not 
an  intimation  whether  the  States  in  rebellion  should  be  allow- 
ed to  come  back,  either  with  slavery  or  without  slavery.  Not 
a  hope  held  out  that  the  policy  of  the  dead  President  was  to  be 
the  policy  of  his  successor. 

But,  again,  what  are  the  terms?  A  general  amnesty  is  one 
of  them.  Upon  this  feature  of  the  memorandum,  the  official 
commentary  is  in  these  words  :  "It  practically  abolishes  the 
confiscation  laws,  and  relieves  the  rebels  of  every  degree,  who 
had  slaughtered  our  people,  from  all  the  pains  and  penalties  of 
their  crimes." 

There  is  not  a  word  in  the  memorandum  that  abolishes  prac- 
tically, or  otherwise,  a  single  law  of  the  United  States.  It 
leaves  the  confiscation  law  untouched.  But  it  does  provide 
for  a  general  amnesty.  Did  Sherman  commit  an  error  in  en- 
tertaining that  policy?  If  so  he  fell  into  the  error  by  follow- 
ing the  lead  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  for  that  was  his  policy.  That  was 
one  of  the  terms  of  settlement  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was  ready  to 
offer. 

It  seems,  however,  that  it  is  not  the  policy  of  the  present  ad- 
ministration, and  that  just  now  itis  not  a  popular  policy.  It  is 
announced  that  there  shall  be  an  amnesty  for  the  people,  but 
not  for  the  leaders.  They  are  to  be  tried  and  hung.  Let  us 
bring  this  policy  to  the  test  of  common  sense. 

1.  Who  are  the  leaders?  Who  is  to  designate  them  ?  Who 
is  to  mark  this  man  for  punishment,  and  that  man  for  deliver- 
ance ?  Who  is  this  political  censor  with  the  issues  of  life  and 
death  in  his  hands? 

2.  We  have  delioerately  recognized  these  rebels  as  belliger- 
ents— and  we  have  entered  into  cartels  with  them  for  exchange 
ot  prisoners — for  the  exchange  of  all  prisoners,  of  all  grades — ■ 
without  one  exception.  Suppose  we  capture  Davis  himself — i 
or  that  he  voluntarily  surrenders  himself  as  a  prisoner;  pray 
what  can  we  do  with  him  ?  Can  we  punish  him?  Can  we  try 
him  bjr  a  Military  Court,  or  any  other  court,  for  the  offense  of 
levying  war  against  the  LTnited  States?  Not  at  all.  We  are 
bound  to  treat  him  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  If  the  war  continues, 
he  is  to  be  exchanged;  if  It  ceases,  he  is  to  be  discharged  from 
custody,  We  must  protect  him  as  a  prisoner  of  war;  we  must 
save  him  from  mob  violence,  and  £;ive  him  safe  conduct,  if  he 
require  it,  when  the  proper  time  comes  for  his  release.  These 
are  sacred  duties  which  we  have  imposed  on  ourselves,  yielding 
to  an  inevitable  necessity  when  this  rebellion  took  the  form  of 
a  mighty  war  between  millions  of  belligerents. 


12 

Bat,  some  say,  the  military  offense  can  not  be  punished,  but 
the  civil  offense  remains,  and  is  hot  provided  for  or  condoned 
by  the  cartel.  We  admit  we  can  not  punish  the  soldier,  as  a 
soldier,  though  taken  red-handed  in  levying  war  upon  us.  Wo 
must  treat  him  a3  a  prisoner  of  war — feed,  clothe,  protect,  and 
give  him  safe-conduct  beyond  our  lines.  We  admit  all  that, 
but  if,  after  the  war  is  over,  we  can  again  capture  him,  then, 
for  the  same  offense,  we  can  hang  him.  It  does  not  strike  ono 
that  this  is  safe  ground  to  rest  upon ;  but  suppose  we  admit  it 
to  be  sound.  What  are  we  to  do  with  the  new  .  captives  ? — 
Take  Davis,  for  instance.  If  we  abide  by  the  cartel  and  dis- 
charge him  as  a  prisoner  of  war,  and,  after  he  is  quite  beyond 
our  power,  he  sees  proper  to  place  himself  again  without  our 
reach,  and  we  arrest  him  for  the  civil  offense,  how  are  we  to 
punish  him.  lie  must  be  tried  for  treason,  but  where?  In 
Massachusetts?  Can  we  select  the  place  most  favorable  for  a 
conviction  ?  Xo;  he  must  bo  tried  in  Richmond,  or,  perhaps 
in  Alabama,  but,  at  least,  in  some  State  where  he  committed 
some  overt  act  of  treason  ;  in  other  words,  somewhere  in  one  of 
the  rebellious  States  Davis  must  be  tried.  He  must  be  tried  as 
all  other  criminals  are  tried,  by  a  jury  of  the  State  or  judical 
district  in  which  his  trial  is  had.  He  must  be  tried,  if  at  all, 
by  an  impartial  jury;  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men,  not  one  of 
whom  has  formed  or  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  his  guilt  or  in- 
nocence. 

When  we  come  to  look  the  matter  square  in  the  face,  the 
idea  of  applying  the  common  rules  and  forms  of  criminal  pro- 
ceedings to  all,  to  an  undefined  part  or  to  a  single  individual 
engaged  in  the  same  gigantic  war,  which  reckons  its  criminals 
by  millions,  seems  flatly  absurd. 

Say  what  we  may,  not  a  man,  great  or  small,  leader  or  fol- 
lower, will  be  hung,  shot  or  beheaded,  for  the  crime  of  levying 
war  against  the  United  States,  as  a  party  in  this  rebellion.  If 
he  was  a  spy  he  might  be  shot;  if  he  conspired  or  took  a  part 
in  the  assassination  of  our  President,  the  cartel  would  not  pro- 
tect him,  for  that  was  not  war  or  protected  by  the  rules  of  war; 
but  if  he  only  levied  war  in  the  same  open  and  regulated  mode 
in  which  the  two  or  three  millions  of  his  associates  levied  and 
carried  it  on,  the  same  defense  that  protects  them  must  protect 
him. 

So  much  for  the  general  amnesty  feature  of  the  memoran- 
dum.    In  another  number  we  will  follow  up  the  subject. 

SIGMA. 


A  WORD  FOR  SHERMAN--K0.  3. 

The  circumstances  of  the  times  are  not  favorable  to  calm  discussion.  The  public 
mind  is  in  a  state  of  excitement.  At  such  a  juncture  we  are  apt  to  rush  with  great  una- 
nimity to  a  eonclusron  which  a  sober,  second  thought  obliges  us  to  reverse.  Becollect 
the  Trent  affair. 

Shermmdoe*  not  forret,  for  a  moment,  that  he  ha*  a  superior.  He  is  careful  to 
name  that  superior  no  less  than  five  times  in  the  "memoraudum."    Every  thing,  ex- 


IP 

■ceptihe  temporary  truew,  is  to  await  the  decision  of  the  "Executive  of  the  United  States-' 
Jormston,ioo,  recognizes  the  fact  that  iie  is  a  subordinate — that  he,  too,  has  a  superior; 
but  vrho  his  superior  is  does  not  appear  any  where  in  the  "Memorandum."  "We  may 
guess,  and  not  be  witleof  the  mark,  that  his  "principal"  was  Davis,  either  as  the  chief 
executive  officer,  or  as  his  Commander-in-chief.  One  thing,  however,  is  certain — Sher 
man  would  not  allow  that  principal  or  even  the  "confederate  States,"  to  be  so  much 
as  named  in  that  paper  ;  and  Johnston  submits  to  the  humiliation.  It  appears  that 
Breckinridge  took  a  part,  no  doubt  an  active  part,  in  the  negotiation — whether  as  a  civil 
officer,  or  in  a  military  capacity,  ie  not  shown,  but  his  name  does  not  appear  in  the  pa- 
per, nor  is  he  allowed  to  sign  it. 

The  official  eommentupun  the  form  of  this  negotiation  isthus  stated:  "It  wasaprac- 
tieal  acknowledgment  of  the  rebel  Government."  In  other  words,  whoever  enters  into 
any  conference  withany  agent,  civil  or  mili'ary,  of  that  rebel  Government,  to  fix  upon 
the  terms  of  its  dissolution,  practically  recognizes  it.  Whoever  entertains  any  proposi- 
tion coming  through  an.  agent  of  thai  government,  for  its  surrender,  abdication  and 
destruction,  gives  it  thereby  a  title  ol  legitimacy.  It  that  is  so,  what  are  we  to  say  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Seward?  What  are  we  to  .-"ay  of  that  conference  in  which  our 
President  and  our  Secretary  of  State  met  il  e.ssrs,  Campbell,  Hunter  and  Stephens,  the 
last  named  second  in  official  rank  to  JJavit  himself '! 

Undoubtedly  there  is  a  punctilio  to  be  observed  in  that  sort  of  left-handed  diplomatic 
intercourse.  Sherman  understood  this  perfectly  well,  and,  therefore,  in  the  matter  of 
form,  the  "mwnoraiiduia"'  is  unexceptionable. 

Proceeding  with  the  terms  of  the  "memorandum"  we  come  to  the  third  article,  which  I 
•quote  in  full: 

••The  recognition  by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  of  the  several  State  Govern- 
ments, on  their  officers  and  Legislatures  taking  the  oath  prescribed  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States;  and  where  conflicting  State  Governments  have  resulted  from  the 
war,  the  legitimacy  01  all  shall  Le  sol  iuitud  to  the  supieme  Court  of  the  United 
States." 

As  the  latter  clause  of  this  article  is  made  the  subject  of  special  criticism  in  the  of- 
ficial commentary,  1  will  consilient  fh.-t  in  ureter.  That  c  rnmentary  is  as  lollows:  "It 
put  in  dispute  tlte existence  ot  the  loyal  state  Government,  and  the  new  State  of  West 
Virginia,  whichhaa  been  recognize-d  by  every  department  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment." 

This  is  new  to  me.  If  that  department  of  our  Federal  Government  called  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  has  yet  recognized,  in  the  only  way  in  which  a  Court  can  rec- 
ognize, thai  is  by  a  decision,  the  lawful  existence  of  West  Virginia,  I,  for  one,  have  failed 
to  see  or  hearot  the  decision.  No  decision  would  give  me  more  satislaclion.  1  consid- 
er that  the  legal  status  of  West  Virginia  is,  and  must  be,  fixed  by  the  recognition  of  the 
Executive  and  the  sanction  of  Congress.  But  the  final  arbiter  has  not  yet  so  decided. — 
It  is  an  open  question,  and  there  is  no  power  in  the  land  to  withdraw  that  question  from 
the  (  ognizanje  or  jurisdiction  of  that  high  tribunal.  It  must  go  there  when  the  proper 
ease  arises.  Virginia  and  West  Virginia — the  two  governments  contending  for  legiti- 
macy over  that  territory — must  go  before  the  same  court  that  settled  the  question  of 
legitimacy  between  the"  charter  government  and  .Dorr's  government,  in  Rhode  Is- 
land. 

if  Sherman  had  signed  a  memorandum  to  refer  the  question  to  foreign  arbitration — 
say  to  Maximilian  or  Louis  ISapoIeon — he  would  have  done  a  very  silly  thing.  Or  if  he 
in.  I  opened  a  question  fully  set  at  rest,  he  would  have  cione  a  very  unwise  thing.  He 
lias  done  neither.  He  has  simply  recognized  the  inevitable  fact  that  the  ultimate  de- 
cision must  be  made  by  the  Supreme  Court.  There  he  was  willing  to  have  it,  and  so 
am  I;  but  willing,  or  unwilling,  there  the  question  must  go. 

We  now  come  to  the  stipulation  which  provides  tor  the  recognition  by  our  Executive 
of  the.  several  state  Governments.  This  recognition  is  one  of  the  consequences  which 
is  to  follow  the  ratification  of  the  memorandum,  but  it  is  not  an  immediate  consequence. 
Fir.-t  of  all,  the  power  called  the  edntederacy,  its  armies,  its  officers  and  its  subjects, 
disappear-  Federal  laws  and  Federal  Courts'come  into  place.  Every  officer  of  every 
Mare,  every  member  of  each  State  Legislature,  is  fast  to  take  an  oath  to  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  states.  Then,  and  not  until  then,  they  are  to  be  recognized. 
A  iid  by  whom  ?  By  the  executive  authority.  Observe  there  is  not  one  word  in  the  mem- 
orandum that  applies  to  any  recognition  by  Congress,  ithappens  that  at  the  time  (;on- 
gresi.S'is  not  in  session.  This  conlederate  government  is  to  surrender  at  once,  but  the 
states  remain,  the  people  remain,  and  lor  the  time  bemgi  at  least,  for  the  interim, 
between  the  surrender  and  the  next  meeting  of  Congress,  some  provision  is  to  lie  made 
by  the  only  authority  capable  to  net  in  the  emergency,  and  that  is  the  executive  au- 
thority. 

This  is  the  first  and  the  necessary  step  to  be  taken  in  order  to  get  these  States  fully 
clear  of  all  disloyal  relations.  The  recognition  is  to  be  mutual.  These  States  first 
recognize  our  President  as  their  President,  Iliev  abjure  the  -Government  and  the' Ex- 
ecutive which  they  had  adhered  to  for  four  years,  and  ask  to  reestablish  the  old  rela- 
tions, and  to  come  at  once  under  the  power  "and  under  the  protection  of  the  Executive 
authority.  All  they  ask  is  present  protection— protection  to  life  and  property  and 
Tiv.i.chises.  just  so  iar  as  our  President,  under  tfteUtfik,  can  afford  protection.  ^Tiepnan 
knew  well, .and  so  did  Breckinridge,  that  a  recognition  by  the  Executive,  and  protect- 
ion to  property  and  franchises,  meant  only  such  '"recognition,  and  such  protection,  as 
the  CWMft'rtVrwri  and  Law*  ofiki'I'iiiUyl  Srortei  allowed  the  Executive  to  give.  There  is  not 
a  .1  old  in  that,  ■■memorandum'1  that  stipulates  for  a  change  beyond  the  just  power  of  the 
President.  On  the  contrary,  it  contemplates  nothing  to  be  done  by  rhePresidonl  be  \  ond 
his  h'.wiid  anthoiitj- — or  as  it  is  worded  in  one  place,  so  far  as   the  Executive  can" — and 


14 

in  tne  summary,  "so  far  as  the  Executive  power  of  the  United  States  can  command.'' 
It  leaves  the  proclamation  of  freedom,  and  the  various  acts  of  Congress  declaring  email* 
oipationin  the  rebel  States,  wholly  untouched.  It  leaves  the  great  question  01  recon- 
struction— a  matter  beyond  the  Executive  authority — wholly  untouched-  It  settles  no- 
thing but  recognition  of  loyalty,  and  present  protection,  until  the  rightful  authority  shall 
decide  the  great  questions  which  remain  in  abeyance.  SIGMA. 


A  WOED  FOR  SHEKMAN— NO.  4. 

I  have  called  attention  to  that  article  in  the  "  Memorandum  "  which  provides  for  the 
recognition  of  the  States— by  the  Executive — the  recognition  of  the  organized  body 
which  constitutes  the  State,  made  up  of  citizens  arid  officers,  civil,  judicial  and  legisla- 
tive, after  all  of  them  have  done,  everything  in  their  power  to  cut  loose  from  their  dis- 
loyal relations.  1  have  said  it  provides  for  Executive  recognition  alone;  for  a  recogni- 
tion ad  interim,;  for  just  such  a  recognition  as  the  Executive  may  be  authorized  to 
make.    So  too,  in  the  fifth  article,  as  to  the  individual  righ.s.  it  is  declared  : 

"  People  and  inhabitants  of  all  states  to  be  guaranteed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  can, 
their  political  rights  and  franchises,  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person  and  property,  as 
defined  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  States  respectively." 

The  official  commentary  on  these  articles  is  a-*  follows  :  "By  the  restoration  of  the 
Rebel  authority  in  their  respective  States,  they  would  be  enabled  to  re-establish  sla- 
very." Undoubtedly  if  this  ■•Memorandum"  provides  for  the  restoration  ot  rebel  au- 
thority, if  all  the  provisions  for  breaking  up  the  military  power  of.the  rebellion,  and  lor 
abjuring  allegiance  to  it,  if  the  disbanding  of  their  soldiers,  the  surrendering  of  their 
armSjtiie  annihilation  of  that  sp'.-ctorof  a  government  known  as  the  Confederate  States, 
if  all  these  articles  mean  oniy  that  the  rebel  authority  is  to  be  restored,  if  tins  is  the 
fair  and  rational  construction  of  this  "program  me,"  then  let  us  accept  the  official  glosj 
as  its  true  interpretation. 

But  it  does  not  follow,  because  the  official  objection  is  unsound,  that  there  is  no  other 
or  sounder  objection.  There  is  much  in  these  articles  to  challenge  attention,  and  to 
produce  an  unfavorably  first  impression.  It  is  not  a  paper  that,  he  who  runs  may  read, 
and  be  sure  that,  he  reads  aright.  There  is  a  sententious  brevity  about  it,  characteristic 
of  Sherman.  Very  much  taken  for  granted  ;  no  long  verbal  expletives  ;  no  exclusions 
of  all  possible  misunderstandings;  no  skillful  word-weighing,  alter  the  manner  of  a  di- 
plomatist: no  careful  conditions,  provisos, and  exceptions,  after  the  manner  of  a  lawyer. 
It  is  the  woik  of  a  soldier,  going  to  the  point  at  once,  written  with  port-folio  on  knee, 
and  struck  oti  with  the  rapidity  of  an  older  or  a  dispatch.  1  wish  some  friend  had  been 
present  to  call  Sherrhan's  attention  to  certain  language  that  might  be  misunderstood, 
or  to  the  propriety  of  adding  expressly  what  was  left  to  interence.  It  was  all  clear 
enough  to  Sheriireu  as  it  stood,  lie  understood  perfectly  well  its  whole  scope  and  just 
meaning,  and  therefore  it  was  that  he  sent  it  to  Washington  with  perfect  confidence  that 
it  would  be  ratified. 

I  can  see,  in  every  word  of  that  document,  that  Sherman  felt  he  was  following  the 
lead  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  initiating  the  very  state  of  tilings  which  Mr.  Lincoln  hadiorc- 
H  had  owed. 

There  is  iu  it  the  provision  for  a  general  amnesty.  That,  certainly,  was  Mr.  Lincoln's 
policy,  and  that,  at  least,  was  lully  wit-inn  the  Executive  control.  By  the  act  of  Congress 
10  suppress  insurrection,  passed  July  1/,  ii'yi,  the  whole  power  oi  pardon  and  amnesty 
"' to  persons  who  may  have  participated  iu  the  existing  rebellion,"  is  given  to  the 
President.  The  act  makes  no  exceptional  :o  leaders — not  even  as  to  the  chief  of  trait- 
ors himself. 

There  is  a  provision  in  the  "  Memorandum "  which  applies  to  Legislatures  in  the 
Southern  States,  as  bodies  which  may  be  recognized  by  tne  President.  Is  that  strange.' 
Is  that  anew  idea?  W.is  notSherman perfectly. well  advised  of  thu  recent  fact  that  the 
President,  had  given  his  consent  to  the  reassembling  of  the  Virginia  Legislature?  What 
a  fatal  mistake  our  great  chief  must  have  made,  if  the  convocation  of  .hat  Legislature 
would  have  restored  •' the  robel  authority"  in  Virginia,  and  would  have  enabled  that 
State  "  to  re-establish  slavery.  " 

There  is  perhaps  no  part  of  the  Memorandum  which  has  been  so  much  misunderstood 
and  perverted  as  that  winch  provides  tor  a  guarantee  by  the  Executive,  -so  far  as  he 
can,"  to  I  lie  people  of  the  States,  "oftheir  political  rights  and  franchises,  as  well  as  their 
rights  of  person  and  property."  Some  imagine  that  by  adopting  this  provision,  our 
E-ceoutive  would  restore  the  old  state  of  things  as  before  the  war,  and  set  aside  all  the 
laws  of  Congress,  and  all  the  proclamations  which  have  been  made. 

It  is  said  that  under  this  guarantee,  Davis  and  Toombs,  and  all  the  leaders  in  the  re- 
bellion, would  be  restored  to  all  their  personal  rights  and  franchises,  and  made  compe- 
tent to  sit  in  Congress,  and  to  regain  all  their  property,  including  their  slaves  emanci- 
pated by  the  laws  and  proclamations  which  have  been  passed  and  made. 

Xothiruj  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  The  President  can  not  repeal  a  Into,  dot  on,;  of 
thru  men  could  taile  a  seat  in  either  House  of  Congress.  Then  «re  disqualified  by  laic.  The 
President  could  not  guarantee  to  one  of  them  the  right  to  become  a  member  ot  either 
House,  for  thaft  power  belongs  exclusively  to  Congress. 

Each  House  is  '-the  judge  "of  the  qualifications  of  its  own  members."  So  that  it  these 
traitors  ever  get  into  Congress  again,  it  will  not  be  the  fault  ot  Sherman,  but  ot  Con- 
gress. . 

Tm-n,  as  to  slavery  and  the  rights  of  property  in  slaves— and  the  rights  of  property  in 
estates  or  things  eoniscated  or  subject  to  confiscation.     The  '-memorandum"  leave*  all 


15 

these  subjects  precisely  where  they  stand.  If  the  proclamation  has  emancipated  the 
slaves  in  the  rebellious  States  their  status  is  fixed  beyond  recall.  No  new  proclama- 
tion can  make  a  slave  of  a  man  now  free. 

So,  too,  if  the  various  acts  of  Congress  have  been  effectual  to  destroy  the  relation  of 
the  slave  to  his  rebel  master,  no  act  of  the  Executive,  no  guarantee  of  the  President, 
and  no  act  of  Congress  can  testore  that  relation.  If,  after  all  this,  the  slave  is  not  eman- 
cipated, then  there  is  but  one  remedy;lett — the  most  effectual  of  all— and  that  is  the. 
amendment  of  the  Constitution.  That  is  sure  to  come,  and  it  will  cut  up  by  the  root 
every  vestige  of  Slavery,  even  in  loyal  States,  yet  untouched  by  proclamaiion  or  act  of 
Congress. 

We  have  now  reached  a  point  at  which,  in  the  consideration  of  these  articles,  Sher- 
man, as  the  immediate  party,  must  drop  out  of  consideration,  forhereare  foreshadowed 
the  elements  of  a  political  contest  in  which  we  must  all  take  a  part.  No  matter  in  what 
way,  or  at  what  time,  whether  now,  by  surrender  unconditional,  or  hereafter,  by  sur- 
render under  terms  agreeable  to  the  Executive,  this  rebellion  may  cease,  a  question  of 
profound  importance  will  arise,  a  question  beyond  Executive"  control,  a  question  for 
the  people,  and  to  be  settled  by  the  people. 

That  question  is,  what  shall  be  our  policy  as  to  those  States  once  in  rebellion,  and  as 
to  the  people  which  inhabit  them. 

The  great  leader  we  have  lost  indicated  what  policy  he  deemed  the  wisest.  It  was. 
quite  evident  that  kks  policy  was  not  accepted  in  certain  quarters,  and  that  the  materials 
uf  opposition  to  him  were  gathering  head,  and  had  made  a  demonstration  in  the  Lou- 
isiana ease. 

His  policy  was  amnesty,  and  tr#  restoration  of  States  once  in  rebellion  to  their  proper 
relation  to  the  Union.  In  the  first  clause  of  his  great  proclamation  he  declares  "that 
hereafter,  as  heretofore,  the  war  will  be  prosecuted  for  the  object  of  practically  reslor- 
ing  the  constitutional  relations  between  the  United  States  and  each  of  the  States  and 
people  thereof,  in  which  States  that  relation  is,  or  may  be,  suspended." 

According  to  Mr.  Lincoln  the  States  remain  as  States,  and  the  inhabitants  are  citizens 
of  the  States,  oniy  out  of  their  proper  constitutional  relation. 

His  policy  v/as'not  to  dissolve  all  the  elements  which  constitute  a  State,  and  turn  each 
political  community  called  a  State  adrift,  without  local  laws,  or  local  government.  His 
policy  (mark  it,  offer  the  war,)  was  not  to  abolish  State  Courts,  State  Executives,  State 
Legislatures,  and  to  leave  the  people  without  law  .without  Sheriffs,  without  jails,  without 
franchises. 

His  policy  was  not  to  hold  them  as  people  within  the  Union — native  born,  too,  and 
yet  stripped  of  the  suffrage,  degraded  to  some  anomalous  condition — neither  citizens  of 
States  nor  Territories,  with  no  security  for  life  or  property.  He  could  not  be  brought 
to  look  upon  tbein  as  a  conquered  people,  and  upon  thetritates  as  destroyed  by  war. — 
No,  Mr.  Lincoln  never  lost  sight  of  the  States.  He  intended  to  recognize  them,  after 
the  war,  a*  /States,  with  all  the  franchises  and  rights,  public  and  private,  that,  under  the 
existing  laws  and  proclamations,  the  war  had  lelt  to  them. 

So  at  least,  for  one,  1  understood  Mr.  Lincoln.  That  is  the  policy  of  the  "memoran- 
dum." Though  it  is  a  matter  ol  little  consequence  to  any  one  but  myself,  yet  I  must  say 
that.  for  one,  1  prefer  Mr.  Lincoln's  views  to  those  ot  Mr.  Sumner,  or  any  one  of  thai 
tdase.  SIGMA. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  N.C.  AT  CHAPEL  HILL 


00032727149 

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THE  NORTH  CAROLINA  COLLECTION 


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